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The current status of the manufacturing 
sector of American business furnishes a co-
gent example of the recognition lag in eco-
nomic life. 
From a cyclical peak of 113.4 in July 1981, 
the industrial production index declined ap-
proximately 13 percent to a low of 100.5 in 
October 1982, or just about back to the level 
of 1977, which is the base year for the index. 
Individual sectors of manufacturing, espe-
cially primary metals, dropped even more 
precipitously. 
During this period, a cottage industry de-
veloped (appropriately in the service sector) 
based on the simplest relationship known to 
quantitative analysts: Two points determine 
a straight line. By connecting the number for 
1981 (for almost any series except unem-
ployment) to the corresponding number for 
1982, analysts observed a downward sloping 
trend line. A brigade of doom-and-gloom 
forecasters began bemoaning the demise of 
American manufacturing and the stagnation 
of the economy generally. 
The year 1982 produced a bonanza of 
negative reports. Ira Magaziner and Robert 
Reich wrote, "The U.S. economy is in crisis . 
. . . In the absence of new strategic directions, 
the crisis can only deepen."l Lester Thurow 
reported, "The engines of economic growth 
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have shut down and they are likely to stay 
that way for years to come . . . . tt2 And, of 
course, 1982 was the year that saw John 
Naisbitt's Megatrends proclaim that the indus-
trial era was over and that we were rapidly 
becoming a microeconomic information self-
help society characterized by a galaxy of net-
working constellations.3 
Given its special recognition lag, it took 
Business Week until March 1986 to conclude 
that the American industrial enterprise was 
becoming "hollow," relegated to the market-
ing of products made in other nations.4 
But the linear economic forecasters were 
caught off guard by an off-their-chart devel-
opment that began in 1982. Late that year 
saw the beginning of the longest peacetime 
expansion in American history. By Septem-
ber 1983, the previous peak in U.S. industrial 
production was passed. The best was yet to 
come. By the end of 1988, the rate of indus-
trial production was 40 percent above the 
previous cyclical low and 24 percent over the 
previous cyclical high. The manufacturing 
sector today contributes just about the same 
proportion of the total output of the Ameri-
can economy as it did three decades ago. But 
the notion of a negative sloping trend line, 
especially in manufacturing, was too deeply 
imbedded to be displaced in prevailing public 
thinking. 
Moreover, the good news often was re-
ported as bad news. That is, rising produc-
tivity enabled the industrial economy to pro-
duce more with less, less labor that is. But to 
those who ascribe to the quaint notion that 
the health of a sector should be measured by 
its inputs rather than its outputs, the results 
were considered devastating. After all, man-
ufacturing employment in the United States 
has never recovered to its peak of slightly 
over 21 million achieved in 1979. 
Those who bemoan the shift in the U.S. 
economy from manufacturing to services 
tend to imply that this is a recent develop-
ment. Despite the attention placed on this 
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shift since 1982, an inspection of the Census 
Bureau's Historical Statistics reveals that the 
crossover from manufacturing to the service 
sector as employment leader occurred in the 
nineteenth century. By 1900, service em-
ployment exceeded manufacturing employ-
ment by a ratio of eight to five. 5 That recog-
nition lag again! 
By 1900, service employment 
exceeded manufacturing employment 
by a ratio of eight to five. 
Most realistic appraisals of the future 
conclude that the total number of jobs in 
manufacturing is not likely to grow much, if 
at all, in the coming decade. But their 
complexity -- and pay -- will continue to rise. 
Flexible automated systems are restructuring 
production technology and helping to keep 
American firms competitive in world 
markets. 
A decade from now, most viable U.S. 
manufacturing operations will be more fully 
automated than they are today. They gener-
ally will have converted to flexible systems 
that can be continually reprogrammed to 
make a large variety of products, attaining 
economies of scope, while maintaining neces-
sary economies of scale. 
Any doubt on that score could be dis-
pelled by just listening to the executives in 
the European Community who fear post-
1992 competition from larger and stronger 
and higher-tech American enterprises. The 
United States continues to possess the basic 
capabilities necessary to maintain leadership 
in many industrial areas. No other nation 
devotes as much to basic research year in, 
year out. R & D performed in the United 
States each year exceeds the combined totals 
of Japan, West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden.6 
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No other country possesses comparable 
capability in computers and software. No 
other economy has the depth, breadth, or 
scope of technical-industrial infrastructure 
that can translate basic discoveries into use-
ful products and processes in a relatively 
short time. 
Moreover, the United States is still the 
world's largest market with a common lan-
guage and a strong entrepreneurial culture. 
The domestic availability of capital resources 
to finance new investment -- and not just in 
LBOs and hostile takeovers -- is awesome. 
While the wailing goes on about the sup-
posed erosion of our manufacturing base, 
three key forces are at work which make for 
a strong industrial sector of the American 
economy in the years ahead: 
1. Numerous company actions are re-
ducing the cost of producing goods and 
services in the United States. 
2. American workers and managers are 
showing a new awareness of their per-
sonal responsibility for the quality of 
what they produce. 
3. Private investment in R & D, the basic 
fuel for innovation and technical prog-
ress, is continuing to grow.7 
Let us examine the increased importance 
of each of these factors. 
Reducing the Cost of Production 
For a variety of compelling reasons 
most notably, to keep up with foreign compe-
tition and to fend off potential takeover 
threats -- a great many American business 
firms have been reducing their costs of pro-
duction. Nearly every sector of manufactur-
ing -- automobiles, steel, chemicals, textiles, 
and machinery -- has been aggressively cut-
ting costs. The specific responses they have 
made range from simple changes in produc-
tion methods to a basic restructuring of the 
entire business. About half of the firms sur-
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veyed by the American Management Associ-
ation downsized their operations between 
January 1986 and June 1987. More have 
done so since. 
For all of 1988, the number of work 
stoppages involving 1,000 employees 
or more totaled 43 -- compared to 
300 a decade earlier. 
Because the compensation of employees 
constitutes about two-thirds of the cost of 
producing the nation's output, labor costs are 
a natural for cutting. The measurable 
changes in the labor market are dramatic. 
Competitiveness has been enhanced by the 
substantial slowing of the rise in wage costs. 
In 1980, the average U.S. worker in the pri-
vate sector received a 9 percent wage boost. 
By mid-1989, the average annual increase 
was half of that. In some industries, workers 
have "given back" prior wage and benefit in-
creases. 
We should not be confused about motiva-
tions. Reduced wage demands and givebacks 
do not arise because workers are suddenly 
worried about stockholders. Rather, their 
new attitude reflects tough on-the-job eco-
nomic education or often out-of-job eco-
nomic education. The new competitive real-
ity has especially impacted workers in com-
panies that, in the past, provided unusually 
generous increases in wages and fringe bene-
fits. 
Strike activity is at the lowest point since 
the Labor Department first started collecting 
the numbers. For all of 1988, the number of 
work stoppages involving 1,000 employees or 
more totaled 43 -- compared to 300 a decade 
earlier. Despite the growth in the labor 
force, the total of 121,400 workers idled by 
strikes in 1988 was a small fraction of the 1.4 
5 
million annual average in the 1970s. 
Import penetration has sparked what of-
ten approaches a war on costs. Companies 
have often obtained union agreement for 
more flexible work rules -- a broadening of 
traditional narrow job classifications -- that 
generate important savings in the production 
process. With new agreements to perform 
several different tasks, fewer workers are re-
quired or the same number of workers can 
produce more. Also, downtime is reduced 
when it is no longer necessary to wait for a 
worker with the right classification to make a 
repair. 
Many American companies have adopted 
the Japanese just-in-time (JIT) production 
and inventory system. In addition to freeing 
up inventory and storage space, JIT has 
forced many companies to do better sales 
forecasting and delivery planning. 
. An ~xtensi.on of the economizing strategy 
IS leadmg to rrnportant structural changes in 
a great many of the larger American corpora-
tions. The horizontally integrated firm, pro-
ducing virtually every product in the markets 
in which it operates, is becoming much less 
prevalent. Many companies -- notably in the 
chemical industry -- are finding it preferable 
to specialize, focusing on specific product 
niches that are more secure against foreign 
competition. This is to be expected as U.S. 
firms find themselves competing more fully 
in a global economy. Fewer domestic mar-
kets now can be thought of as part of a closed 
economy. 
In addition, a rapid rate of product inno-
vation has been emphasized by many U.S. 
firms, especially in industries that are hard 
hit by imports. American shoe companies 
have responded with stylish footwear to ward 
off foreign competition. Apparel manufac-
turing, one of the most import-affected in-
dustries, is relying heavily on style to com-
pete with low-cost foreign products. 
Clothing producers are maintaining prof-
itability through improved timing and greater 
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flexibility of production. Foreign apparel 
makers typically need six months or more 
lead time to coordinate manufacturing with 
retail sales. Some domestic companies can 
produce products for store shelves in three to 
four weeks. That enables them to set a trend, 
with foreign producers lagging a season be-
hind. 
Improving Product Quality 
Foreign inroads into U.S. domestic mar-
kets have frequently been caused by the su-
perior quality of imports rather than just 
lower costs. As a result, unprecedented pres-
sure has been generated for improving the 
quality of products that American businesses 
manufacture. 
The payoff from higher quality is larger 
than generally perceived. It comes from the 
savings realized by doing the job right the 
first time, avoiding the costs of reworking 
and repairing defective products and, in the 
process, avoiding the alienation of customers. 
At some manufacturing companies, em-
ployees receive as much as forty hours of 
training to enable them to measure the qual-
ity of their output, a move that often has re-
sulted in a rise in defect-free products com-
ing off assembly lines. 
The enhanced concern with improving 
quality in American industry has not been 
primarily a matter of setting up new quality 
control departments or even expanding ex-
isting ones. Companies in the United States 
have traditionally devoted more resources to 
quality-control efforts than their foreign 
counterparts. 
Quality assurance means more than just a 
collection of expensive professional person-
nel who check, review, and improve produc-
tion practices. The most effective quality 
controls involve a shift in the locus of respon-
sibility -- from the inspectors in the quality 
control department to the people who actu-
ally do the work. 
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The Growth of Industrial R & D 
It has become commonplace to state that 
American business thinks short-term and that 
this unfortunate tendency shows up in de-
creasing outlays for research and develop-
ment. Commonplace, yes. True, no. A little 
historical and statistical perspective can be a 
real eye opener. 
As we know, the 1980s witnessed a sub-
stantial growth in the R & D fmanced by the 
federal government, mainly for defense pur-
poses. This was a significant departure from 
the trend of the 1970s, where federal gov-
ernment spending for R & D, in real terms, 
was stagnant. According to the traditional 
wisdom, civilian R & D in the 1980s should 
have declined as scientific and technological 
resources were being hogged by the military. 
For the decade 1980-89, 
private industry outspent the 
federal government on R & D, 
$445 billion to $430 billion. 
Actually, something very different oc-
curred in the private sector in the 1980s, si-
multaneous with the rapid defense buildup. 
For the first time since the National Science 
Foundation began gathering the data, busi-
ness outlays for R & D exceeded government 
R & D spending. For the decade 1980-89, 
private industry outspent the federal gov-
ernment on R & D, $445 billion to $430 bil-
lion (in constant 1982 dollars).B In eight of 
those ten years, the private sector has been a 
larger source of financing for R & D than the 
public sector. The number of scientists and 
engineers in American industry doing R & D 
rose from 469,000 in 1980 to 595,000 in 1987. 
Consider the implication of these num-
bers. In the United States, private business 
traditionally performs the bulk of R & D. 
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However, prior to 1980, most of the projects 
were sponsored by the federal government 
and business was responding to the public 
sector's priorities. But since 1980, most of 
the R & D work performed by American 
companies has also been fmanced and spon-
sored by them. Thus, the results are far more 
geared to commercial markets than in the 
past. 
On this basis, I suggest that there is an ex-
cellent chance that, contrary to general ex-
pectations, we will see more product and 
process innovation in the United States in 
the years ahead. As Alfred Chandler, the 
distinguished business historian, reminds us, 
technology has been the prime mover behind 
the success of the modern corporation.9 
The Three Factors Together 
These three factors -- cost cutting, quality 
improvements, and expanded research and 
development -- rarely yield quick and dra-
matic changes. Yet, their cumulative effects 
are likely to endure and to reinforce each 
other. All three factors work in the same di-
rection -- toward developing new or better or 
cheaper products. 
These changes will not prevent imports 
from continuing to threaten individual com-
panies. Influences external to the industrial 
economy often can be vital. Exchange rate 
fluctuations, as we have seen in recent years, 
can be of especial importance. But, over the 
longer run, these three basic forces make for 
a brighter industrial outlook for the United 
States as a whole. 
Solid evidence is already available. The 
average manufacturing company in the 
United States has become more productive 
during the 1980s, in the conventional terms 
of how much is produced per labor hour. 
From 1973 to 1981, domestic manufacturing 
firms averaged a subnormal increase in pro-
ductivity of 1.5 percent yearly. From 1981 to 
1988, the average rate of productivity growth 
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more than doubled, to 3.8 percent a year 
(that is also comfortably higher than the av-
erage rise of 2. 7 percent a year during the pe-
riod 1948-1973). 
Thus, there is a reasonable basis for be-
lieving that American firms will be more ef-
fective competitors in world markets in the 
years ahead. Likewise, the relative attrac-
tiveness of domestically produced products to 
American consumers is being enhanced. 
A word of warning is in order: these posi- r-
tive developments in American industry do 
not guarantee success in the future. Over-
seas competitors will not run in place while 
U.S. companies try to catch up or keep 
ahead. 
And new international competitors are 
vying for global markets. It is ~triguing to 
note that South Korean construction compa-
nies, which have increasingly been giving 
their American counterparts tough competi-
tion in bidding on overseas projects, ar~ now 
complaining about the even-lower-cost nvalry 
from Turkish and Indian firms. 
The Public Policy Outlook 
The chances of a strengthened manufac-
turing sector in the 1990s will be influenced 
by changes in public policy. Efforts to reduce 
the budget deficit on the revenue side can re-
sult in further increases in the tax burden on 
saving and investment. . . 
In contrast action on the budget deficits 
' . 
via spending cuts would be construct~ve, es-
pecially if the cuts focus on consumption. It 
is worrisome that budget deficits have be-
come a means for converting private saving 
into public consumption. A lower deficit 
should also reduce the pressure on real inter-
est rates. That would reduce the high cost of 
capital in the United States, a key deterrent 
to competitiveness. 
Should domestic protectionist pressures 
succeed in erecting additional trade barriers, 
much of the burden would be borne by the 
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industries using the higher-priced, protected 
products. Conversely, new trade barriers put 
in place by the European Community could 
inhibit U.S. exports. 
Enhancing the competitiveness of 
American industry is not a question of 
how to get government to do more for 
manufacturing, but how to get it 
to do less to manufacturing. 
A new round of burdensome domestic 
government regulation would both raise the 
cost of compliance and deter companies from 
investment and innovation. Further use of 
"social mandates" to finance federal social 
objectives off budget -- such as higher mini-
mum wages, compulsory health insurance, 
required parental leave -- would increase the 
cost of doing business in the United States. 
On balance, the potential changes in public 
policy, at home and abroad, seem to be in 
large part negative in terms of their impact 
on the industrial economy. 
Thus, enhancing the competitiveness of 
American industry is not fundamentally a 
question of how to get government to do 
more for manufacturing, but how to get it to 
do less to manufacturing. Regulation should 
be made more cost-effective and less oner-
ous. The tendency for Congress to "do good" 
via social rnandates should be curbed. Fed-
eral deficits should be reduced, but not by 
adding to the tax burdens on saving and in-
vestment. 
There is one key aspect of public policy 
which is ripe for positive improvement -- ed-
ucation of the nation's work force. It is 
nothing short of a national disgrace that this 
country's literacy rate is lower than that of 
most countries with whom we compete and 
our school dropout rate is higher. An in-
creasing number of unglamorous manufac-
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turing industries in the United States report 
difficulty in attracting young new workers 
with even minimum math and reading skills. 
But these difficulties should not lead us to 
the erroneous conclusion that we must spend 
more on education, although the marginal re-
turn on investment in education continues to 
be relatively attractive. The fact is that, each 
year since 1980, the people of the United 
States -- from federal, state, local, and private 
sources -- have been spending more on edu-
cation, per pupil, than the year before, and in 
real terms. We also spend a larger share of 
our GNP on education than most other na-
tions. 
The real shortage in education is in ways 
of spending the money wisely. Take the 
chronic shortage of high school math and sci-
ence teachers. For decades, the public school 
systems have refused to pay more for skills in 
short supply. If colleges and universities 
were to follow such an archaic "comparable 
worth" approach, every medical school in the 
country would be forced to close, as would 
most engineering schools. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, however, the future of manu-
facturing will be determined by the business 
sector, by those business executives that 
make the tough product, market, and finan-
cial decisions that are at the heart of in-
creasing productivity and maintaining com-
petitiveness. 
On the other hand, the specter of high-
powered business executives running to 
Washington with hat in hand is not a partic-
ularly noble one. In this regard, there is an 
important role for the citizen/voter to sup-
port changes in government policies that 
make it less attractive to travel to Washing-
ton for help. A bailout is a bailout, even if 
it's for high-definition television. Say's law --
supply creates its own demand -- works with 
a vengeance in this area: the supply of aid to 
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''worthy" businesses encourages the demand 
for that aid. 
Citizens offended by large corporate PAC 
contributions and generous honoraria to 
members of Congress should focus on the 
root cause -- the great amount of arbitrary 
power over business possessed by govern-
ment officials. Reducing that power is the 
most effective way of curbing PACs and dis-
couraging honoraria to the makers of gov-
ernment policy. 
Those political contributions will not be 
forthcoming so readily if the money could be 
put to better use in more conventional busi-
ness undertakings. The nation's welfare --
and its economic efficiency -- would indeed 
be better served by redirecting those re-
sources into productive private investment. 
The inevitability of American deindustri-
alization and the "hollowing out" of American 
business is just another example of modern 
mythology. On balance, the future prospects 
for American manufacturing are bright, far 
brighter than generally realized. 
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